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INTRODUCTION
Recent actions by President Donald Trump in the name of national and
energy security may do more domestic economic harm than good.1 In
March 2018, President Trump instituted tariffs on steel and aluminum
under Section 232 of the Tariff Act for alleged national security
protection.2 However, the tariffs could bring more negative economic
Copyright 2019, by RACHEL FALGOUTMOODY.
1. SeeDonald J. Boudreaux,Donald Trump's Tariffs Hurt American Workers
and Ruin Relationships with Our Allies, USA TODAY (June 6, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/06/06/donald-trumps-tariffs-hurt-
workers-and-weaken-national-security-column/670087002/ [https://perma.cc/64V
2-EJRL].
2. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., SECTION 232 INVESTIGATION ON THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS OF STEEL ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, https://www.commerce.gov
/section-232-investigation-effect-imports-steel-us-national-security#factsheet232
[https://perma.cc/ZB28-RG56] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
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312 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
effects than positive.3 For example, for each steel production job in
America, higher steel and aluminum prices negatively affect 80 jobs in
downstream4 sectors.5 Although the law gives the President discretion to 
enact and carry out many orders in America, President Trump likely
exceeded his constitutional and delegated power by unilaterally imposing
Section 232 tariffs on account of national security.6 President Trump’s
declaration of a national security threat and improper usage of Section 232
to place tariffs contravene the principles of separation of powers and
system of checks and balances that the Constitution assures.7 
Without any form of congressional check or judicial review on a
president’s true intentions, goals, and motivations, the president wields
unauthorized national and world power. Although the president, as the
Commander-in-Chief, should likely have discretion in defining national
security threats, there should be a more quantitative analysis and collective
agreement on trade and commerce as a national security threat, so the 
broad discretion cannot be abused.8 
Since there is arguably no articulated intelligible principle in the
Section 232 Tariff Act, Congress has delegated the U.S. President an
improperly broad power. Therefore, a president should not be able to
impose tariffs on countries based on national threats to the United States 
economy under Section 232 without amending the statute. This Comment 
addresses the way these tariffs were imposed and how Section 232 should
be amended. It is likely President Trump improperly implemented the
tariffs on steel imports through Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962 under
the guise of national security interests. Furthermore, as of now, there is no
congressional check on presidents in this decision, which has significant
and widespread impacts internally and externally of America’s borders. 
3. David Fickling, Trump’s Tariffs Are Killing American Steel with
Kindness, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/opinion/articles/2019-01-19/trump-tariffs-to-protect-u-s-steel-can-t-mask-poor-
valuations [https://perma.cc/CB4R-UNBR] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
4. While upsteam is considered the phase of exploration and production for
the oil and gas, downstream is usually considered to span from after the
production phase to the point of sale of the product.
5. Boudreaux, supra note 1.
6. See United States v. George S. Bush & Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 371, 380, 60 
(1940).
7. AIIS Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of Section 232 Steel Tariffs:
Questions and Answers, AIIS, http://www.aiis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018
/06/EMBARGOED_June_27_Lawsuit_Q_A_AIIS.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5J6-
WK4H] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
8. See Edward T. Hayes, United States, 66 LA. B.J. 217, 218 (2018).
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3132019] COMMENT
Part I explains the importance of energy security in America and how
the executive and legislative branches have the power to protect the
country through constitutional and delegated power. Part II presents the
implications and effects of abusing power when given unconstitutional
authority. It analyzes past and present presidential uses of Section 232
tariffs while challenging Congress’s delegation of that power. Part III
proposes amendments to Section 232 to provide an intelligible principle
to reframe it in accordance with the Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND
Tariffs have been utilized throughout United States history. Most
recently, President Trump invoked Section 232 tariffs on steel and
aluminum which have had adverse effects on energy industries and energy
security. Under the law as it is currently written, any incumbent president
has the potential to abuse this tariff power because Section 232 lacks an 
intelligible principle and sets out broad considerations for the president to
weigh. As described below, the vague qualifications are stated as broadly
as “any other relevant factors.”9 
A. Give Me Energy Security or Give Me Death
The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security as “the
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”10 The
U.S. Department of State holds the position that national security and energy
security are threatened when (1) U.S. allies cannot access affordable or
diverse sources of energy; (2) foreign energy markets exclude U.S. 
businesses; (3) poor administration inhibits market-based resolutions; (4)
conflicts arise from competing for energy leads; and (5) terrorists or
dangerous regimes fund violence through exploiting energy resources.11 
Generally, long-term energy security considers investing in energy
production paralleled with economic and environmental developments and
needs.12 Additionally, short-term energy security concentrates on the energy
9. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM GUIDE:
THE EFFECTS OF IMPORTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY (2007).
10. What is Energy Security?, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/
topics/energysecurity/whatisenergysecurity/ [https://perma.cc/78J6-9KRG] (last
visited Aug. 5, 2019).
11. Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment,
BUREAU OF ENERGY RES., https://www.state.gov/e/enr/ [https://perma.cc/PA8R-
H4Q9] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
12. Id. 
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314 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
system’s capability to react quickly to abrupt changes in supply and 
demand.13 Without energy security, countries face a higher likelihood of
political and civil unrest, geopolitical instability, and reduced economic
performance. This includes physically lacking energy and noncompetitive
or volatile pricing.14 
B. Delegation of Power from Congress and the Constitution
The United States Constitution Article 1, Section 1 expressly and
exclusively delegates all legislative power to Congress.15 Congress then
delegates many of its constitutional powers to agencies. Without this
ability, Congress would be ineffective without the ability to delegate,
consult, and rely on subject-matter experts in the agencies.16 However, to 
properly delegate this constitutional power, Congress must include an
intelligible principle in its legislative act to guide the agency that would
implement and carry out the duty.17 To be constitutionally sufficient,
Congress must include an intelligible principle that “clearly delineates the
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries
of this delegated authority.”18 
When an intelligible principle exists, Congress does not violate the
non-delegation doctrine because Congress is not delegating legislative
power to the executive branch.19 The Constitution’s purpose affords 
Congress the “flexibility and practicality” is essential to function
properly.20 Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained in J.W. Hampton v. 
United States that when Congress seeks aid from a separate branch, “the 
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination.”21 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.”
16. See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941)
(“In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its
functions if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions
which support the defined legislative policy”); see also United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 274 (1967) (opinion concurring in result).
17. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
18. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Am. Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S. Ct. 133, 142, 91 L. Ed. 103 (1946).
19. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
20. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
21. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 406.
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  319 1/3/20  7:23 AM
   
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
     
 
   
 
   
     
    
   
 
    
     
  
  
  
   
   
 
 
   
   
    
 
   
    
 
    
   
   
   
   
   
     
      
 
    
    
    
3152019] COMMENT
The constitutional authority on international trade rests on a fine balance
between the legislative and executive branches of government.22 While the
legislative branch exclusively controls both domestic and foreign
commerce, the executive branch broadly oversees national security and
matters of foreign affairs.23 It is important to note, however, that while the
Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive regulatory powers on
domestic commerce in the United States, the Foreign Commerce Clause is
regarded as giving a more expansive grant of authority to Congress. 
Furthermore, the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation
provides the executive branch with guidance for presidential trade actions
as delegated by Congress.24 Under the TPA, Congress reserved the right
to review and vote on presidential trade agreements.25 However, President
Trump invoked Section 232 to authorize presidential trade actions rather
than under the TPA.26 As previously mentioned, Section 232 is not subject
to congressional review or approval like the TPA, which makes Section
232 ripe for potential abuse if no intelligible principle is set forth.27 
The American Institute for International Steel (AIIS) filed suit in June
2018 to challenge the sufficiency of an intelligible principle set forth in
Section 232 and the appropriateness of a delegation of power.28 The 
plaintiffs in AIIS v. United States objected to the constitutionality of
Congress’s delegation of power to the president and disputed the
protection of the principles of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances.29 The plaintiffs represent companies whose steel pipe 
and tube products are vital to the “production and distribution of oil and
gas.”30 The tariffs on steel impede the production and transportation of oil
and gas because domestic United States of Oil Country Tubular Goods
(OTCG) producers do not manufacture sufficient supplies to satisfy the
plaintiffs’ needs.31 While the steel products that the plaintiffs seek are
22. Hayes, supra note 8.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. 
28. AIIS Complaint, Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel v. United States, No. 18-00152
(U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade June 27, 2018). This case was pending at the time this
Comment was submitted.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 3.
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316 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
accessible in the United States, the foreign prices for the same or higher
quality products are more competitive and appealing.32 
While the non-delegation doctrine has been considered a legal fiction,
the fact that the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in 2018 for
Gundy v. United States33 on the threshold issue as to the existence of an
intelligible principle shows that the Supreme Court is willing to rule 
against violations of the non-delegation doctrine. The outcome of Gundy
will speak to the future challenges to congressional delegations of power,
specifically to Section 232. While Gundy is about the U.S. Attorney
General unilaterally making law about registered sex offenders, the case 
has the potential to have a widespread effect on the federal government
and its agencies depending on the scope of the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
If the non-delegation doctrine is revived and expanded in the Gundy
decision, it has the potential to preclude the United States from carrying out
“very basic environmental laws, among other things.”34 This expansion of
the non-delegation doctrine would fundamentally limit the federal
government.35 It is also unclear if proponents of the non-delegation doctrine,
like Justice Neil Gorsuch, would allow agencies to consider what is best for
their industries or fields.36 For example, proponents like Justice Gorsuch 
may not allow agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
operate under guidelines to decide what is “the best system of emission
reduction” required by power plants since proponents likely would not
consider such guidelines an intelligible principle.37 
Even if Gundy is ruled to be a constitutional delegation of power or if
the holding is confined to the facts of the case of the registered sex
offenders, Gundy is important. While the Supreme Court has not struck
down any laws in violation of non-delegation since 1935, the Supreme
Court’s undertaking of this type of issue shows its interest in the matter.38 
32. Id. at 4.
33. Gundy v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018). This case has been
decided, since submission for publication, but Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Roberts,
and Thomas expressed opinions that would imply a reconsideration of the non-
delegation doctrine.
34. Ian Millhiser, Want to Know How Badly Republicans on the Supreme
Court Will Overreach? Watch This One Case, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://thinkprogress.org/supreme-court-gundy-sorna-case-republican-overreach
-fd7aa93ec82d/ [https://perma.cc/3G64-A5W4].
35. Id.
36. Id. 
37. Id.
38. Congress Must Do Its Own Job—Make Laws, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/8JNZ-G37W (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
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3172019] COMMENT
This opportunity allows the AIIS and others to plead a successful case
against Section 232 lacking an intelligible principle.
C. Tariffs and Constitutional Power
Tariffs are essentially “a tax on imports”39 that serve to: (1) stimulate
economic development; (2) provide the government with revenue; and (3)
protect the United States markets by forcing higher prices on the
importation of foreign products.40 Traditionally, tariffs have polarizing
effects between those who believe in raising tariffs and those who believe
in lowering them.41 On one hand, there are protectionists who favor raising
tariffs “to protect domestic industries and jobs.”42 On the other hand, there 
are those who favor a free market, believing that lower tariffs increase
prosperity.43 
The United States Constitution sets out in its first article that
“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States.”44 Shortly after implementation of this
article, in 1789, the first Congress expanded tariffs’ function to include
“the encouragement and protection of manufactures.”45 This “protective 
principle” for tariffs laid the foundation for debate that progressed over the
next century and a half.46 Since 1789, Congress has passed many tariffs,
but the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 was one of great significance.47 
This tariff in particular created the highest protective level in U.S.
history.48 Thus, foreign countries reacted by employing retaliatory tariff
39. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 287 
(2d ed. 2001).
40. 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 9 (2012).
41. Nadia Gire, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Revival in
United States Trade Policy Reform, 20 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 60 (2012).
42. Ben Baumgartner, Chewing It Over: Determining the Meaning of Edible
in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 293,
323 (2015).
43. Id.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
45. Tariff Act of 1789, § 1, 1 Stat. at 24.
46. Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History,
34 UCLA L. REV. 285 (1986).
47. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
48. Marcos Valadao & Nara Galeb Porto, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, FTAA and
its Effects in Federal Taxation of International Transactions Between the United
States and Brazil: A Comparative Study, 10 LAW&BUS. REV. AM. 705, 715 n.47
(2004).
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318 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
acts as a result of the Tariff Act of 1930,49 which worsened the Great
Depression.50 
1. What in Tar(iff)nation! Section 232: Procedure and 
Considerations
For the president to act under Section 232, there is a lengthy procedure
and inquiry. First, the Secretary of Commerce shows that an “article is
being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”51 Then,
Section 232(b) of the Act authorizes the President to “take such action,
and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [the]
article and its derivatives so that . . . imports [of the article] will not so
threaten to impair the national security.”52 
The Commerce Department considers certain criteria under Section
705.4 of the Investigations Program Guide to determine the effects of
imports on national security, starting with the quantity of the article.53 As 
noted in the Section 232 of the Investigation Program Guide, the 
Commerce Department also inquires into domestic production, capacity,
and growth requirements needed for projected national defense, as well as 
“any other relevant factors.”54 
With respect to the economy and the national requirements for United
States security, the Commerce Department also considers (1) the effect of
foreign competition on domestic industries vital to U.S. national security;
(2) displacement of U.S. products that cause a decrease in employment,
government revenue, specialized skills and investments; and (3) “[a]ny
other relevant” present or future factors that cause America’s national
economy to weaken.55 
49. Id. 
50. John Brinkley, Trump Loves Tariffs, But No One Else Does, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/08/08/trump-loves-tariffs-but-no-
one-else-does/#1dc46b75662e [https://perma.cc/X5HZ-DXEN] (last visited Aug.
5, 2019).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-41) (corresponds to
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(b)).
52. Id.
53. U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., supra note 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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3192019] COMMENT
II. IMPLICATIONS OF AN ABUSE OF POWER
As previously stated, presidents can misuse Section 232 since it lacks
an intelligible principle. Below is how U.S. Presidents have used Section
232 and how President Trump’s improper invocation of it affects energy
security. 
A. All it Takes is a President’s John Hancock: Presidential Use of 
Section 232
Presidents who have invoked Section 232 tariffs include: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald
Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Donald Trump.56 While each
president in the past used the Section 232 tariffs for restricting or
modifying oil imports, President Trump arguably manipulated Section 232
to influence international trade by imposing a tariff on steel and aluminum
under the guise of national security.57 However, President Trump is not
the first president who invoked Section 232 tariffs that ironically created
a larger threat to energy security which it sought out to protect.58 After 
President Eisenhower established the Mandatory Oil Import Program
(MOIP), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
arose in response and later posed a strong threat to America’s energy
security.59 
President Trump’s use of Section 232 calls for a constitutional inquiry
since the boundlessness of the structure and its effects are more apparent. 
For example, President Ford’s use of Section 232 provided compelling
triggers and limits.60 After a full-scale investigation on imported oil under
Section 232, President Ford found that not only did the United States
depend on imported oil, but also that its dependence on supply from
foreign oil importers was growing.61 Thus, that dependence and growing
56. Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and
Policy Framework for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 
U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 235, 243 (1989).
57. See Luke Basset & Ned Price, Abuse of Power: Debunking the Trump 
Administration’s National Security Argument for Coal, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
(Aug. 16, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/
2018/08/16/454866/abuse-power-debunking-trump-administrations-national-secur
ity-argument-coal/ [https://perma.cc/6EZ3-YKPN].
58. Bialos, supra note 56.
59. Id. 
60. See id.
61. Id.
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320 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
reliance on foreign suppliers created a national security threat that could
leave the American economy susceptible to both a supply reduction and
price increase.62 The Treasury Department’s analysis offered compelling
reasons why national security was threatened.63 
B. Tariff Effects on Energy Security
Tariffs on steel may do more domestic economic harm.64 These tariffs
may actually weaken the United States by protecting jobs in inefficient
industries, inhibiting job growth in economical industries, and damaging
U.S. relations with its allies.65 The U.S. steel industry is healthy and does
not need tariffs to protect it. In fact, since U.S. steel mills are operating at
only 30% of their capacity, they could readily meet the military’s elevated
demands if a war broke out.66 Furthermore, the United States leads the 
world in steel imports, purchasing 35.6 million tons of steel in 2017
alone.67 Canada is the next biggest importer of steel in the world, only 
accounting for 16.7% of the United States’ total steel imports.
As a whole, pipelines serve an important role in energy security.68 
Pipelines are the safest, most effective method of transporting oil and 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 247.
The analysis stressed that the OPEC embargo caused the price of oil
imports to quadruple from approximately $2.50 per barrel to more than
$10.00 per barrel and had devastating effects on the overall economy,
including a reduction in GNP by some $10 to $20 billion, a 0.5% increase 
in the unemployment rate in just 6 months (i.e., approximately 500,000 
people lost jobs), and a significant increase in the Consumer Price Index.
The study also noted that the sharp price rise caused by the OPEC 
embargo substantially increased the total U.S. oil bill and, hence,
significantly eroded the U.S. balance of payments.
64. Boudreaux, supra note 1.
65. Id. 
66. Id.
67. Factbox: Top Steel Exporters to the United States, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradefactbox/factbox-top-steel-exporters-to
-the-united-states-idUSKCN1GE10I [https://perma.cc/KG8C-VXBA].
68. SeeMark Green, Here’s Why U.S. Energy Sector Opposes Tariffs on Steel,
AM. PETROLEUM INST. (June 1, 2018), https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-
issues/blog/2018/06/01/why-united-states-energy-sector-opposes-tariffs-on-steel 
[https://perma.cc/P8JV-TY74].
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3212019] COMMENT
natural gas.69 The oil and natural gas industry in America depends on
importing specialty steel because of the lack of quality and quantity of
American products necessary for “drilling, pipelines, LNG export
facilities, refineries, and petrochemical operations.”70 Removing this 
specialty steel increases the possibility of delays and cancellation of
current and prospective U.S. energy projects.71 Restricting the steel supply
suspends or interrupts the manufacture and construction of steel, which
suspends and interrupts investment projects in critical energy
infrastructure projects. Ultimately, restricting steel supply disrupts the
transportation of natural gas and oil within the United States.72 Natural gas
power plants depend on pipelines to deliver fuel for their operations.73 In
other words, delaying steel means energy production gets delayed.74 
Moreover, tariffs do not compel U.S. steel producers to increase
production and conform to the needs of the oil and natural gas producers
who rely on the importation of specialty steel.75 Accordingly, American 
steelmakers have good reason to not incur the costs.76 The steel producers
are not ensured an increase in long-term demand as the current or next
administration could simply remove the tariffs.77 The steel producers can
hardly justify expanding and upgrading the plants as it would cost “tens of
millions of dollars per facility.”78 
The Trump Administration’s unprompted and improper invocation of
“national security threats” dilutes and politicizes the very safeguard that
the Section 232 tariff purportedly seeks to protect.79 By using defense 
arguments to favor certain electricity generators needs above others, the
Trump Administration ignores competitive energy market rules.80 
Moreover, if national security and energy security are truly the concern for
President Trump, then other measures would also have been taken.81 
69. See DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, MANHATTAN INSTI. FOR POLICY 
RESEARCH, PIPELINES ARE SAFEST FOR TRANSPORTATION OF OIL AND GAS (2013),
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/pipelines-are-safest-transportation-oil-
and-gas-5716.html [https://perma.cc/2RSH-2LQH].
70. Green, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Green, supra note 68.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Basset & Price, supra note 57.
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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Severe weather, strength of energy infrastructure, and dependence on
railways to ship energy commodities pose equal or more serious threats to
energy and national security.82 
President Trump revealed what is likely the true intention behind the
tariffs—international negotiation power. On March 5, 2018, he tweeted
how the tariffs would “come off” if Mexico and Canada negotiated a “fair”
new deal moving forward on the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).83 Similarly, on September 17, 2018, President Trump tweeted
how the “[t]ariffs have put the U.S. in a very strong bargaining position.”84 
The tweet continued to state, “If countries will not make fair deals with us,
they will be ‘Tariffed!’”85 These tweets indicate that the tariffs were not
wholly intended for national security grounds, but for the President’s
ulterior motives, namely bargaining power in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations and leverage on trade
negotiations with China and the European Union. Under the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in December 2018, the United 
States failed to exempt Mexico and Canada from Section 232 tariffs on
steel and aluminum.86 
C. President Trumps Use of Section 232 Tariffs
Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to govern
foreign trade under Article I, § 8, clause 1, Congress allocated the authority
to impose tariffs to the president through Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962.87 Therefore, the president has the power to impose
82. Id.
83. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Mar. 5, 2018, 3:47 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/970626966004162560?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/KC9N-CQBS].
84. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 17, 2018, 3:11 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1041630722413527040 [https://perma
.cc/Y696-AXZZ]. “Tariffs have put the U.S. in a very strong bargaining position,
with Billions of Dollars, and Jobs, flowing into our Country - and yet cost increases
have thus far been almost unnoticeable. If countries will not make fair deals with
us, they will be ‘Tariffed!’”
85. Id.
86. Stephen Barlas, USMCA Trade Deal Fails to Address Tariffs,
FABRICATOR (Dec. 11, 2018) https://www.thefabricator.com/blog/usmca-trade-
deal-fails-to-address-tariffs [https://perma.cc/7WAU-ERE7]. 
87. Scott Suttell, The China-to-Case Western Reserve University Pipeline Is
Flowing at Full Speed, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Aug. 28, 2018, 12:54 PM),
http://www.crainscleveland.com/scott-suttell-blog/china-case-western-reserve-
university-pipeline-flowing-full-speed [https://perma.cc/AQ8X-JWM7].
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tariffs once the Commerce Department shows that certain imports harm
U.S. national security.88 However, President Trump is likely using Section
232 with free rein for protectionist purposes. The Commerce Department
found that the steel and aluminum imports posed a national security threat
to the U.S. Notably, Section 232 has not been invoked since the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was formed in 1995.89 However, it cannot be
overlooked that the U.S. government considered and denied Section 232
action in 1991 and 2001.90 
Conforming to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,91 
President Trump delivered two presidential proclamations to impose
tariffs on steel and aluminum on March 8, 2018, which became effective
March 23, 2018.92 The proclamations were procedurally preceded by the
U.S. Department of Commerce’s finding that the national security of the
United States was impaired by certain steel and aluminum imported
products.93 This report led President Trump to impose a 25% import tariff
on steel and a 10% import tariff on aluminum worldwide.94 
The report showed that the United States is the largest importer of steel
in the world, with imports that are nearly four times that of its exports.95 
Additionally, it was reported that since 2000, six basic oxygen furnaces
and four electronic furnaces have been shut down. Furthermore, since 
1998, employment in the steel industry has dropped by 35%. Currently,
there is only a single U.S. producer remaining for certain types of steel
used for electrical transformers.96 China is the largest producer, exporter,
and source of steel in the world.97 Notably, China’s excess capacity itself
surpasses the total U.S. steel-making capacity, and their average monthly
production of steel equals almost as much steel that the United States
88. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-41).
89. Tom Miles, Trump's Extraordinary Tariffs, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-explainer/trumps-extraordinary-
tariffs-idUSKBN1GH2IR [https://perma.cc/LC3A-CTJH].
90. Id.
91. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-41).
92. Hayes, supra note 8.
93. Id.
94. Id. 
95. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SECRETARY ROSS RELEASES STEEL AND
ALUMINUM 232 REPORTS IN COORDINATION WITH WHITE HOUSE (2018),
https://www.awpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Section-232-Press-Release-
DOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/36PV-UD53] (last visited Aug. 16, 2019) [hereinafter
STEEL AND ALUMINUM 232 REPORTS].
96. Id.
97. Id.
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produces in an entire year.98 “As of February 15, 2018, the U.S. had 169
antidumping and countervailing duty orders in place on steel, of which 29 
are against China, and there are 25 ongoing investigations.”99 It is
important to note that although national security was the purported
justification, the Department of Defense concluded there was no national
defense need to impose restrictions on imports.100 
Moreover, the United States implemented two methods to properly
obtain exclusions or exemptions.101 First, the U.S. Department of
Commerce can grant product-specific exclusions.102 Second, the U.S.
Trade Representative and White House have discretion to allow country-
wide exemptions.103 Accordingly, the United States immediately granted
Canada and Mexico temporary exemptions. Furthermore, some countries
such as Australia, Argentina, South Korea, and Brazil were given
temporary exemptions.104 
However, not all large countries received the benefit of exemption. In
response, retaliatory tariffs on the United States began when China
imposed $3 billion worth of import tariffs on April 2, 2018. China’s tariffs
on assorted U.S. commodities, such as wine, fresh fruit, dried fruit and
nuts, steel pipes, modified ethanol, and ginseng were implemented with
the purpose and intent to send a message to various “politically sensitive
jurisdictions.”105 China also responded with its request to the World Trade
Organization for a dispute-settlement consultation, and its contention that
the U.S. tariffs violate the World Trade Organization Agreement on
Safeguards.106 
Arguably, this tariff would never have passed in the first place if
Congress had been able to vote on it, as evidenced by the proposed
legislation following President Trump’s invocation of Section 232 in
March 2018. Six additional proposals occurred in 2018 between the House
and the Senate to amend Section 232 “[t]o provide for congressional
review of the imposition of duties and other trade measures by the
executive branch, and for other purposes”107 and further “to require the
Secretary of Defense to initiate investigations and to provide for
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Hayes, supra note 8.
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. STEEL AND ALUMINUM 232 REPORTS, supra note 95.
105. Hayes, supra note 8.
106. Id.
107. H.R. 5760, 115th Cong. (2017).
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congressional disapproval of certain actions, and for other purposes.”108 
All six recent proposals were made within five months between March 14,
2018, when President Trump initially implemented the tariffs, and August
1, 2018.109 
III. SOLUTION
Section 232 arguably provides an unconstitutional, limitless grant of
power to the president, and calling upon “national security” does not
simply convert the tariff into a constitutional power.110 In a concurring 
opinion,111 Justice Rehnquist noted that the intelligible principle
requirement, “ensures that courts . . . reviewing the exercise of delegated
legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable
standards.”112 
To rectify Section 232’s lack of an intelligible principle, this section
could be amended in numerous ways to provide guidance to presidents
who invoke it. Totally repealing Section 232 would not be advisable
because the government, whether directly from Congress or as delegated
to an agency or the president, should retain the means to protect the 
country from serious and actual national security threats. While Congress
could technically still impose tariffs without 232’s grant to the president,
this process could take longer and be less efficient. There are benefits to
the president retaining this power, such as a faster reaction time to national
security threats, instead of having to pass through Congress. 
To begin, the first obvious action to rectify Section 232 is to ratify the
proposals already made to Section 232. The House and the Senate should
ratify the proposals to remove the Commerce Department from the
investigation of national-security trade threats and replace the Commerce
Department with the Defense Department. The Defense Department’s
mandated function and purpose is to protect national security.113 Once the
Defense Department identifies a national security threat, the Commerce
Department and the U.S. Trade Representative would then formulate a
108. S. 3329, 115th Cong. (2017).
109. Id.
110. Response Memorandum Support of Plaintiffs’, Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Reply Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, AIIS v. United States,
376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (2019) (No. 18-00152).
111. Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 
(1980).
112. Id.
113. Suttell, supra note 87.
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remedy.114 While the president would determine the appropriate remedy,
Congress would have the right to review and oppose his judgment “with a
joint resolution in the House and Senate.”115 Thus, approving the
amendment would expand Congress’s role in Section 232 cases.116 
This proposal, however, might reach too far to totally remove the
Commerce Department from the investigation. Another solution to
amending Section 232 would be to simply add the Defense Department
alongside the Commerce Department to investigate and make
recommendations to the president. Present and future threats to commerce
can endanger the nation’s economy and overall security, so Congress
arguably should not completely remove the Commerce Department from
the assessment of national security threats under Section 232, as the 
currently proposed legislation recommends.
Congress should balance competing interests and attempt to
compromise; it should not chase one goal to the exclusion and detriment
of every other goal.117 As Section 232 is written, the president does not
have to consider the consumers or any domestic economic harms that the
tariffs can produce. Furthermore, to include an intelligible principle, there 
should be a requirement to differentiate the countries that the United States
imposes a tariff on the grounds of national security needs. Section 232
does not require the president to consider America’s allies. Canada, and 
by extension Mexico, should be considered separately as they are “safe
and reliable source[s] of supply.”118 There is little evidence to show that
Canada and Mexico would not aid America in supplying steel if America
was threatened. Additionally, relief under Section 232 can still be attained
without applying it to the countries that share borders with America.119 
To restore the deficiencies of an intelligible principle, more specific
guidelines should be enlisted in Section 232. As Section 232 is currently
written, it includes the “virtually limitless”120 catch-all phrase, “without
114. Id. 
115. Id.
116. Id. 
117. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017).
118. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC. OFFICE OF TECH.
EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE NATIONAL
SECURITY 29 (2018), http://cifer.pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn/uploadfile/2018/1129/20
181129100939306.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7AZ-LBCD].
119. Id.
120. AIIS v. United States, 18-00152, at 10 (Oct. 5, 2018), Response 
Memorandum Support of Plaintiffs’, Opposition to Defendants’ motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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excluding other relevant factors.”121 The phrase “national security” serves
no guidance because it remains an ill-defined, expansive, and boundless
consideration. As opposed to the long line of cases dismissing the notion
of the non-delegation doctrine, Section 232 is open-ended regarding what
triggers imports as national security threats and the scope of the remedy.122 
One way to limit the otherwise unlimited scope of the president’s
power under Section 232 is to create an objective trigger. The intelligible
principle could simply be satisfied if used for the objective purpose of
“[equalizing] the differences between foreign and domestic production
costs for similar articles.”123 This would give proper oversight to review
challenges to Section 232—a criterion to precisely mark an abuse of
power. Thus, the tariff would only be used for a set purpose and could not
be manipulated to advance hidden agendas to support specific industries
121. Section 232(d) states:
For purposes of this section, the Secretary [of Commerce] and the
President [of the United States] shall, in the light of the requirements of
national security and without excluding other relevant factors, give 
consideration to domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such
requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of the human
resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services 
essential to the national defense, the requirements of growth of such
industries and such supplies and services including the investment,
exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth, and the
importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character,
and use as those affect such industries and the capacity of the United
States to meet national security requirements. In the administration of
this section, the Secretary and the President shall further recognize the
close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national
security, and shall take into consideration the impact of foreign
competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries;
and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government,
loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the
displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports shall be 
considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such
weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security.
122. AIIS v. United States, 18-00152, at 9 (Oct. 5, 2018), Response
Memorandum Support of Plaintiffs’, Opposition to Defendants’ motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
123. Algonquin SNG, Inc. v. Fed Energy Admin, 518 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1975, rev’d 426 U.S. 548 (1976)) (citing Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394 (1928)).
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“without any showing of inequality or unfair trade practices.”124 This
would further check the president’s political and economic preferences
and monitor his intentions and motivations for imposing tariffs.
Section 232 has no duration or guideline to bring an end to the tariffs
it imposes. Therefore, the tariffs should be constructed more like Section
201 of the Trade Act of 1974125 and be more temporary in nature. As
Section 201 is focused on restoring U.S. industries back to health,126 
Section 232 should be amended so that its tariffs cease when the threat no
longer remains.
CONCLUSION
The tariffs on imports to the United States under Section 232 have
been implemented under the guise of national security protection.
President Trump’s true intention seems to be more focused on positioning 
himself with greater negotiating power in other matters. Accordingly,
there should be some type of check on the president’s intentions as well as 
guidelines for the president to follow for such a tariff since it has
substantial effects on the United States, the energy industry, and the world.
As it stands, Section 232 lacks an intelligible principle to guide present
and future presidents on how to identify and manage national security
threats. By creating structure and implementing objective triggers within
Section 232, it can become constitutional and less vulnerable to
presidential abuse.
Rachel Moody 
124. See AIIS v. United States, 18-00152, at 10 (Oct. 5, 2018), Response 
Memorandum Support of Plaintiffs’, Opposition to Defendants’ motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
125. 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-41).
126. CONG. RESEARCHSERV., SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSIONACT OF
1962 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10667.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM7Y-
R2X6].
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